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 Theories of categorization typically assume that categories are represented by some 
set of features that describe the properties of category members. However this view of 
category representation is incomplete. This dissertation lays out a framework for category 
representation, following Markman and Stilwell (2001), that creates a taxonomy of 
categories based on different components of relational structures. Relational categories are 
categories of entire relational systems while, role-governed categories, are represented as 
the roles in these systems.  Lastly, thematic-relation categories group entities together 
that play complementary roles within a system.   
 Four experiments are presented in support of this framework. They contrast 
thematic-relation categorization with role-governed categorization. Thematic-relation 
categorization entails categorizing objects together that play different roles within a 
domain, while role-governed categorization entails categorizing two entities that play the 
same role across domains. When the two are put in direct conflict, people prefer to form a 






across-domain connections.  The purpose of the four experiments is to examine ways to 
boost the preference for role-governed categorization, thus revealing underlying processes. 
 Here, role-governed categorization is facilitated in two ways. Experiment 1 re-
frames the question of category formation as novel word extension. Natural role-governed 
categories have labels while thematic-relation categories do not. This pattern is reflected in 
the measured behavior as novel labels are extended across members of role-governed 
categories more readily than across members of thematic-relation categories. 
 By claiming relational structures are critical to category representation, the 
framework described in this dissertation predicts that role-governed categorization and 
analogical reasoning share underlying mechanisms. Experiments 2-4 examine how making 
an analogy between the members of role-governed categories facilitates forming such 
categories. When making an analogy, people align the relational representations of a pair 
of domains, putting entities into correspondence by role, ignoring featural dissimilarities.  
When analogical comparison is induced, the rate of role-governed categorization is shown 
to double as compared to a baseline with no such analogical processes. The thesis 
concludes by outlining several future lines of research generated by unifying the fields of 
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 Investigating the representation of categories is one of the larger areas of research in 
Cognitive Psychology.  While there have been many variants, most theories posit that 
categories are represented by collections of features that describe category members, e.g.,  
a bird is an animal with wings and a beak.  These are feature-based categories (e.g. Rosch, 
1973).  Some representational approaches posit that features are discrete and unbound 
(e.g. Tversky, 1977), some posit that features are bound by causal theoretical knowledge 
(e.g. Murphy & Medin, 1985), and others represent features as dimensions, or values 
along dimensions in mental spaces (e.g., Rips, Shoben & Smith, 1973).  However, these 
theories all share the idea that there are feature-based categories, and the featural 
information is subordinate to the category label. This means that the features are 
contained within the category representation, and the label refers to this representation 
(Markman & Stilwell, 2001).    
 More recently, there have been arguments that this view of categories does not 
account for the breadth of natural categories, despite its success explaining results from 
artificial category learning experiments, (e.g. Gentner & Kurtz, 2005; Goldwater, 
Markman, & Stilwell, under review 2009; Markman & Stilwell, 2001). Many categories 
are defined, not by featural information subordinate to their label, but by their role in 
larger relational representations superordinate to their labels, i.e. they are role-governed 






They are defined by their place in the larger hierarchy whose existence allows the 
individual rank concepts to be induced.  
 By positing a different form of category representation, the proposal for role- 
governed categories makes at least two types of (related) predictions. Each of these is 
discussed in depth below. First, different entities will be categorized together than 
previously thought. Second, different mechanisms will underlie categorization judgments. 
For example, if someone notices that a sling is supporting a dislocated shoulder, and a 
tripod is supporting a camera, that the sling and the tripod could be categorized together, 
as each is playing the supporter role. In addition, the mechanism of forming such 
categories could be shared with analogical comparison, which entails aligning relational 
structures by putting objects into correspondence by role (e.g., Gentner & Markman, 
1997).   
 This dissertation has the following structure: First, I review Markman and Stilwell’s 
theoretical account, discuss its explanatory and predictive power, and compare it to other 
research on categorization. Second, I review my recent work investigating the 
representation of role-governed categories empirically (Goldwater, et al. 2009; Goldwater, 
Markman, Trujillo, & Schnyer, in prep, 2009). Third, I present my dissertation 
experiments that investigate the process of role-governed categorization by examining 
under what circumstances objects will be categorized by their common relational role.  In 












1. Theoretical Perspectives on Category Representation   
 In this section I lay out my working model of category representation.  This view of 
representation posits that there are multiple kinds of categories defined by their 
representational format (including role-governed and feature-based).  I first briefly 
describe all of them, and then go into more detail about each, with a focus of how they 
relate to role-governed categories. In addition, I motivate this framework for category 
representation by discussing how it provides a new perspective to some classic problems 
in categorization, and make several novel predictions.  
 To place the idea of role-governed categories into perspective, first consider the 
simple relation x visits y illustrated in Figure 2.  This figure assumes that people represent 
relationships among elements in their environment.  Proposals for knowledge 
representation often use structured relational representations to account for these 
relations (see Markman, 1999, for a review).  In a structured representation, there is an 
explicit connection between elements, so that the scope of a predicate is determined by 
the arguments that it takes.  In the relation x visits y, visits describes a relation between 
two elements x and y (which serve as the arguments to the relation).  The elements x and 
y in this case are variables, and so they can be bound to a variety of different objects in 
different settings in order to allow the cognitive system to represent different instances of 
the event using the same relation.  






form a class of objects, namely those objects that play that role in some event, situation, 
or structure.  If items that play that role were somehow important to an individual, then a 
category label could be attached to that role and used as a category.  So, a guest could be 
defined as the individual that visits.  That is, the category would name the first argument 
to the relation x visits y in Figure 2.  Similarly, a barrier might name a class of items, such 
that x blocks y, and a shield might name a class of items so that x protects y.  On this 
view, then, whenever someone creates a relational system, they open up the possibility 
for a category that names the roles within that system. Evidence for this view is provided 
in Chapter 2.  
  Viewing knowledge as relational structures predicts the existence of multiple kinds 
of categories distinct from role-governed (as seen in Figure 2): relational categories, 
thematic categories and feature-based categories. Here, I will briefly discuss each, before 
giving a more full treatment to them all in addition to a complete discussion of role-
governed categories in the following sections.    
 A relational category is one that refers to an entire relational structure (Markman  
& Stilwell 2001, and see Gentner & Kurtz 2005 for a very similar discussion).  For 
example, in x visits y, x is the role-governed category guest and y is the role-governed 
category host, but a visit refers to the relational system x visits y, and thus is a relational 
category.  Another good example is the distinction between the relational category trip, 






system of travel, relaxing, the destination, etc.  Destination picks out just one role within 
the relational system.    
 Thematic categories (Lin & Murphy, 2001) group a set of items that all take part in 
a common relational system or event, though they play different roles within that event.  
So, often people will categorize milk with cereal even though milk probably bears more 
similarity to other drinks.  This relationship is different from role-governed categorization 
because thematic relations group things together that play different roles in the same 
event, as opposed to the same role across different events.    
 Feature-based categories have been given the most attention in the literature on 
artificial and natural categories. When researching natural categories, researchers positing 
feature-based representations primarily focus natural kinds and artifacts, e.g. dog and 
chair. These categories are the most commonly used stimuli in semantic priming tasks 
(e.g. Cree, McRae, & McNorgan, 1999 among many others).  They are used for Rosch’s 
classic property listing tasks.  In addition, virtually every artificial category learning 
experiment has subjects learning categories easily represented by features. In our 
perspective, feature-based categories are critical because for every instance of a role- 
governed category, there is a member of a feature-based category fulfilling that role.  A full 
treatment of the relations between feature-based and role-governed categories are 
discussed below  






 I start with relational categories because their representation is primary; role- 
governed categories are induced from them (Markman & Stilwell, 2001). Relational 
categories pick out the relations amongst elements in the environment. These relations 
may only relate two elements, as in x visits y, or name more complex systems with many 
interrelated entities, e.g., scandal, which involves the perpetrator, a misdeed, a potential 
cover up, and a set of people who care enough about the perpetrator that the misdeed is 
considered a scandal. That is, the misdeed is drastic violation of the expectations for the 
perpetrator, given his public role. For example, a bum buying underage minors alcohol is 
not a scandal, while the president doing so is.    
 There are at least five kinds of relational categories: verb categories, preposition 
categories, event scripts, taxonomies, and comparatives.  The first two receive their name 
from grammatical categories, as they are reliably lexicalized as such.  
 Verbs are the primary linguistic medium for encoding complex relations. Their 
representation is one of the most well studied topics in linguistic theory (e.g., Jackendoff,  
1990). Verbs point outward to other concepts; specifically to the entities they bind to 
their argument slots. They bind their arguments by specifying how their arguments relate.  
Most frequently verb arguments relate through causal action.  By binding their arguments, 
they assign each a “thematic role, ” i.e. their role in the relation named by the verb.  For 
example, if a verb names a causal action, then the verb would assign one argument as the 






Analogous to how feature-based object categories decompose into their features, 
verb representations decompose into more primitive relations (Gentner ,1975; Jackendoff, 
1990, 2002; Levin & Rapaport-Hovav, 2006; McKoon & MacFarland, 2002; Wechlser, 
1995). We give examples of verb relational structures for give and exchange to illustrate 
this point (for a more detailed analysis of the semantics of verbs of possession see 
Gentner, 1975). Give involves a transfer of possession of some object Z from person X to 
person Y. 
Give: X CAUSE [Y POSSESS  Z]  
Exchange is a reciprocal giving event, so when one person (X) gives some object (Z) to a 
second person (Y), Y in turn gives a second object (W) to X.  That leads to the rather 
complex relational structure 
Exchange: [X CAUSE [Y POSSESS Z]] CAUSE [Y CAUSE [X POSSESS W]] 
 In these representations, as mentioned above, the place-holders for potential 
arguments are frequently represented by variables, but we believe that these variables are 
not just empty place-holders.  Instead, they include rich conceptual information about 
what is typically bound to the variables, i.e. the stuff of role-governed categories (see 
more below; Ferreti, et al., 2001).    
 Preposition categories are similar to verbs, as they point outward to other concepts 
and bind a small number of arguments. Unlike verbs, which tend to describe actions, 
prepositions tend to encode spatial and temporal relations, e.g., above, and before.  






structure of events described by sentences. For example, when verbs describe events that 
entail a change of location, often the resulting spatial relation amongst the verb’s 
arguments will need to be specified by a preposition, e.g., “Bob put the book on the 
shelf.” While verbs represent rich conceptual information about their typical arguments 
(Ferreti et al., 2001), prepositions seem to specify more skeletal perceptual information 
at most.  For example, along specifies something linear, but on only requires that its 
arguments have spatial extension, i.e, they are objects (Landau & Jackendoff,  
1993).   
 While verbs refer to actions and events, they only bind a small number of 
arguments.  “Event scripts,” however are larger-scale relational knowledge structures that 
organize and sequence a number of component actions, binding an indefinitely large 
number of entities (e.g., Schank & Abelson, 1977). For example, going on a date entails a 
series of characteristic actions.  Event scripts have a somewhat hierarchical organization 
(Shank, 1982), as we may have separate scripts for going on a dinner and movie date, or 
going to a wedding with a date. Clearly, each has their own set of subcomponents, and is 
highly interrelated with other event scripts, e.g., attending weddings. Support for scripts 
as representations in memory comes from a variety of sources, including the ability to 
make inferences about missing pieces of information in a discourse, or recalling more 
script- relevant information for a passage of text than irrelevant (e.g., Owens, Bower & 






in scripts reflect this richness (Ross & Murphy, 1999; see below).  
 Taxonomies are large knowledge structures that can bind many elements together for 
the purpose of classifying elements by their place in that system. For example, the 
military hierarchy, or any rank based system is a taxonomy. Rank systems exist for the 
purpose of classifying individuals to establish how they can relate to one another by 
assigning role-governed duties and privileges. Family is another taxonomy; mother, uncle, 
etc name roles within this. There has not been much psychological research into 
taxonomies as relational categories. Often research into “taxonomic categories” refers to 
research on natural kinds, because biologists have developed taxonomies organizing them 
hierarchically based on their biological similarities, creating classifications of increasing 
generality. There has been much less research into taxonomic systems as concepts in their 
own right.  
  The final kind of relational category is “comparatives.” These state quantitative 
relations among sets of or properties of entities e.g., identical, greater, and fewer.  
Because these relations seem relatively simple, there has not been much research into 
these concepts in adults, but their learning and representation has been a topic of both 
developmental (Smith, 1989) and comparative psychology (Premack, 1983). For example, 
Thompson and Oden (2000) suggest that non-human primates do not display an 
understanding of the concept `identical ’ (e.g. that two identical squares are in the same 






 While there has been a lot of research on relational categories, this work is not 
typically framed explicitly as the study of categorization (cf., Morris & Murphy, 1990).  
In fact, research on event scripts has sometimes had the goal of showing how different 
their representations are from categories (Barsalou & Sewell, 1985).  One reason that 
relational categories are not be discussed as if they were categories, is that research into 
natural categories tend to rely on verbal report (e.g., in a property listing task), and (with 
the exception of event scripts) most information about relational categories is not verbally 
accessible (Sieck, et al. 1999). For example, if one were to ask subjects to list the 
properties of “giving” or “between,” subjects would most likely give a definition, and 
then just seem confused.  However, to have a complete theory of categorization, the 
study of relational categories must be unified with the study of feature-based, e.g., by 
having subjects learn artificial relational categories using similar paradigms as their learning 
of feature-based categories (c.f., in developmental psychology, the same paradigms have 
been used to examine noun learning and relational word learning, e.g. Casasola & Wilburn,  
2004).  
1.2 Role-Governed Categories  
 Role-governed categories are induced from relational categories. However, relational 
categories will differ from each other in their ability to support such inductions, and in 
theory, role-governed categories will differ depending from which kind of relational 






support for role-governed categories, as they only constrain role-fulfillment to entities 
that can relate to others spatially, temporally, or quantitatively, which essentially all 
entities can.  All roles are fulfilled by entities that could be cross-classified as members of 
feature-based categories, e.g. guests tend to be humans, but if the relational structure 
places no constraints on role-fulfillment, then there is no motivation to create a concept 
for that role because classifying something as a member of such a role-concept adds no 
information about that entity.     
 Unlike prepositions and comparatives, verb categories support role-governed 
category creation, i.e. verbs license role-governed categories. Many role-governed 
categories are clearly related to verbs. As an additional example to guest above, the 
concept of a thief relies crucially on verbs like steal, because the defining characteristic of a 
thief is that this individual is the first argument to the relation x steals y. Table 1 lists 
more corresponding verbs and role-governed categories.   In addition to these example sets 
that do not bear a morphological relation, the “–er” morpheme in English allows us to 
freely derive terms for typical agents, a type of role-governed category, from verbs, e.g. 
dance and dancer.  
 In addition to this linguistic evidence, there is experimental evidence supporting the 
claim that verb representations include the conceptual information of their typical 
arguments.  Ferretti et al.. (2001) show that in a lexical decision task, verbs prime their 






typical instruments, e.g. stir primes spoon, and features of patients, manipulate primes 
naive. Interestingly, computational models of semantic memory currently cannot account 
for these findings because they rely on featural overlap between concepts (Cree et al..,  
1999); they cannot represent relational structures.  
  Ferretti, McRae and colleagues’ results (e.g, McRae, Ferretti, & Amyote, 1997) are 
important support for role-governed concepts because if these concepts were parts of 
relational structures, they would be as specific as their root relational categories.   
Traditionally, thematic roles have been seen to be very general (Jackendoff, 1990); agent 
is just an entity that causes something. That thematic roles are verb-specific, or as 
specific as classes of just a few verbs (e.g., Filmore, 1982), is predicted from the current 
framework.   
 In addition to verb categories, event scripts support category formation because 
they are rich knowledge structures. For example, we have lots of cultural knowledge based 
on scripts for eating.  We know how eating lunch, dinner, and breakfast differ, and how 
eating at an upscale restaurant differs from eating at a fast-food restaurant.  One way 
these scripts differ is simply by which foods are eaten in each situation, creating 
categories such as breakfast foods. Ross and Murphy (1999) demonstrate that foods are 
categorized by their script-based roles, e.g., waffles with eggs, in addition to categorizing 
foods based on featural overlap, e.g., waffles with cookies.    






categories. Categories do not exist just to support classification.  The most highly studied 
function of categories is induction i.e., given the knowledge that an entity is a member of a 
category, what can be predicted about that entity (e.g., Osherson, et al., 1990)? In the 
feature-based view of categories, there has been a focus on what features could be induced 
from shared category membership, e.g., if waffles have a particular nutrient in them, then 
cookies may be predicted to have that same nutrient. Script-based categories support 
inductions like these to a lesser degree than feature-based, but Ross and Murphy (1999) 
demonstrate that they do support inductions about situations. Knowing that waffles 
were served at an unfamiliar ceremony, subjects were more likely to think that eggs would 
be served than cookies.  Showing the role-governed categories support different kinds of 
inductions than feature-based shows why humans would be motivated to form such 
categories.   
 Taxonomies support role-governed categorization, e.g., private and general are 
induced from military hierarchy. As discussed above, taxonomies can be used to organize 
pre-existing concepts, as in the natural kind taxonomy. Presumably, concepts for 
individual animals predate taxonomic classification, thus, unlike role-governed categories 
like colonel, supervisor, and cousin, natural kinds are not representationally defined by 
their place in the taxonomy. However, even in this case, the existence of the taxonomies 
licenses categories that are the placeholders for natural kinds. That is, phlyum, genus, etc 






feature-based categories.   
 Two other proposals about category representations bear some similarity to the 
idea of a role-governed category.  First, Rehder and Ross’ (2001) abstract coherent 
categories come closest to bridging the gap between categories used in artificial category 
learning experiments and role-governed representations. In their studies, the exemplars of 
their abstract coherent categories are all represented by distinct feature sets, but what 
makes the exemplars part of the same category is that each distinct set is made coherent 
because all aim to satisfy a common function (e.g. to get rid of pollution).  Many 
functionally-based categories are role-governed categories, because they play a particular 
role within a causal relational structure.     
 Barsalou (1983, 1985) discusses goal-derived categories that people are able to 
create in a given situation.  For example, the category of things to take out of the house in 
the event of a fire are all objects that satisfy a particular role in a (somewhat strange) 
relational structure.  The proposed framework suggests that goal-derived categories in 
general may be one type of role-governed category.  Barsalou suggested that one 
difference between goal-derived categories and feature-based categories is that 
prototypical category members are important for feature-based categories, but ideal 
category members are important for goal-derived categories.  For example, diet foods are a 
goal-derived category, and the ideal diet food is low in calories and tastes great.   It is 






categories, they have more prominent ideals than feature-based categories (see below).  
1.3 Thematic-Relation Categories  
 Thematic relation categories group entities together that play corresponding roles in 
a relational structure, e.g. king and crown, milk and cereal, dog and bone, fly and 
dumpster.  Up until recently, most of the research on these categories was conducted with 
children, because these categories were seen as a developmental precursor to more 
“mature” feature-based categories (e.g., E. Markman, 1989).  However, recent research by 
Lin and Murphy (2001) shows that adults often exhibit a preference for thematic relation 
categories over feature-based categories.  Lin and Murphy (2001) argue that adults 
represent both kinds of categories, and they serve different functions. Members of 
thematic relation categories co-occur in situations, thus, properties acquired by contagion 
could be spread from one member to another. Lin and Murphy show that knowing one 
member of a thematic relation category has a certain bacterium, e.g., fly, leads to a stronger 
induction that another member of a thematic relation category, e.g., dumpster, carries that 
bacterium than another member of a feature-based category, e.g., mosquito.  
 Thematic relation categories group entities playing complementary roles in the same 
situation, while role-governed categories group entities together playing the same role 
across situations. Each type of category is rooted in learning about situations, i.e., 
relational structures. However, it is unknown how the two kinds of categories relate in the 






one learn about guests without learning about hosts, and that guests and hosts form a 
thematic relation category? Or does each type of categorization involve an attention shift 
at the consequence of the other kind? No research has yet examined learning novel role- 
governed and thematic relation categories from novel situations together.  
1.4 Feature-Based Categories and Role-Governed Categories  
 Because feature-based categories are the primary area of study in categorization 
research, a summary of this work would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead,   
I focus on the way that feature-based categories fit into the current framework, and 
particularly how they relate to role-governed categories.  
 Roles are filled by entities that also have descriptive features.  Often, these features 
become crucial parts of the representation of role-governed categories. In particular, these 
features are in the service of recognition processes. For example, military officers of 
different ranks have different numbers of stripes on their uniform. These signs of rank 
allow superior officers to be recognized without parsing complex social relations defined 
by respective ranks. Indeed, processing unstructured feature-based representations 
demands fewer resources than fully bound relational structures (Markman, 1999).  To 
ease such processing demands, we set up our environments to enable the identification of 
relational structures via featural correlates.   
 The intentional replacement of relational processing with featural can be clearly seen 






governed categories because they are defined by their functional roles. However, in 
practice artifact representations may be primarily feature-based because their functional 
roles are consistently fulfilled with the same features.  The consistent use of features, for 
example, eases recognition of and induction about products at Walmart. Members of the 
class of blenders or vacuum cleaners, for example, all tend to look the same. To be a 
blender, all something has to do is blend stuff, but in reality, blenders all blend stuff in 
essentially the same way, and even when the function is not performed in the same way, 
many design features are kept consistent with other products. In addition to these reasons 
for hypothesizing artifacts are represented featurally, they are often the objects of study 
in research conducted in the feature-based framework, so I will also operate with that 
assumption. In the next chapter, I present experimental evidence that artifacts are 
represented as feature-based and differently from role-governed natural categories.  
 In addition to artifacts, there are other situations where the line between role- 
governed categories and feature-based categories appears fuzzy because roles are filled by 
the same objects very consistently, and those objects play those roles very consistently. 
For example, homes are often houses, pets are often dogs, and vice versa. As a result, their 
representations are likely to share content. However, this overlap does not deny that their 
representational distributions are separate. And, the difference is not just one of 
generality. Pet is not more general than dog, as animal is, because even though pet’s 






that are not pets, but all dogs are animals. It is an important avenue of future research to 
investigate the consequences of the aggregation of relational and featural knowledge for 
both role-governed and feature-based categories.  
1.4.1 Representational Format and Category Definitions  
 In addition to predicting novel phenomena, the current framework offers new 
perspectives on classic puzzles posed with feature-based views of categorization. The 
first is whether categories have definitions.  From Aristotle to the mid twentieth century, 
western thought has generally considered categories as definable, leading to clear binary 
decisions about whether something is a member of a given category.  Wittgenstein (1968) 
countered this long-standing assumption, using game as his primary example of a 
category with no definition.   He argued there were no defining features common to all 
games, but all games share some features with at least one other, forming a family 
resemblance structure. Rosch and Mervis (1975) showed that people learn categories 
with such structures. However, this argument conflates categories having definitions and 
having feature-based representations.  Markman and Stilwell (2001) consider game to be a 
role-governed category, i.e. the y in x plays y. The reason there are no common defining 
features are because roles can be fulfilled in an indefinite number of ways.  By considering 
categories as collections of features subordinate to the category label, many have missed 
the potential defining power of superordinate relational structures.   






seems to have a straightforward definition: an unmarried man. Priests fit this definition, 
but are not considered bachelors. However, as discussed in Filmore’s “frame semantics” 
(e.g., Filmore, 1982) bachelor is not just a collection of features, but is a point in a 
stereotypical timeline of male life. This timeline binds phases of life together into a 
temporal relational structure. This timeline starts with childhood, and eventually gets to 
married life with kids, and then grandkids and retirement, etc.  The reason priests are not 
bachelors is because they are not going through this typical life trajectory; bachelorhood is 
a point that assumes marriage is coming next.  
1.5 Conclusion  
 This chapter’s goal was to lay out a working model of category representation. In 
the next section, I lay out my recent work supporting these views.  The goal of the first 
three studies I review was to empirically distinguish natural role-governed categories from 
natural feature-based.  The following two examine the proposed connection between role-
governed and relational categories, that novel relational categories will license novel role-






2. Recent Work  
2.1 Empirically distinguishing role-governed from feature-based categories  
 We know a lot about our natural categories, and role-governed categories are no 
exception. A productive way to investigate our knowledge is through a property-listing 
task (Rosch, 1973; McRae et al., 1997; Bar & Caplan, 1987), thus, this task should reveal 
differences between role-governed and feature-based categories.   Markman and  
Stilwell’s (2001) proposal is that role-governed categories are pieces of, and are defined 
by, larger knowledge structures.  Our knowledge about them should contain a lot about 
the larger knowledge structures of which they are a part and are defined.  In contrast, our 
knowledge of feature-based categories should consist primarily of descriptive properties 
of category members.  
 Barr and Caplan (1987) pointed out that there are two kinds of properties listed in 
these tasks.  Intrinsic properties describe category members.  For example, being furry is 
an intrinsic property of dogs.  Extrinsic properties point outward to other objects.  For 
example, being owned by people is an extrinsic property of dogs.  To clarify, I used the 
term “property” to refer to items listed in a property listing task, while the term 
“feature” is reserved for a mental representation. 
 Barr and Caplan’s research assumed that all categories are represented as sets of 
features, and so they did not have predictions about which categories were likely to have 






would differ along this dimension, and that other aspects of their representation, like 
exemplar typicality gradients, would differ correspondingly. Because my working model 
makes a claim about different formats of representation, it generates novel predictions 
about which categories will elicit more intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties. Of course, what is 
listed is not identical to mental representations, however, what is listed is a window into 
mental representations.  
 The analysis I have given of role-governed categories suggests that extrinsic 
properties should be produced more for role-governed categories than for feature-based 
categories.  I propose that role-governed categories are part of larger knowledge 
structures, and thus point outward to other aspects of these structures. Descriptions of 
such relations among entities, by definition, are coded as extrinsic. Feature-based 
categories should primarily elicit intrinsic properties; knowledge about them is relatively 
self-contained as their features are subordinate to their labels.    
 Goldwater et al. (2009) conducted a property-listing task with role-governed and 
feature-based categories, and coded properties listed using Barr and Caplan’s coding 
criterion. The feature-based categories used were artifacts.  Artifacts exist because of their 
functions, and functional information is considered extrinsic by Barr and Caplan, so they 
provide a strict control condition. When listing properties for “typical examples” of the 
categories, subjects listed approximately 70% intrinsic properties for artifacts, and 75% 






the proposed framework.  
 To relate these findings to natural use of these categories, I conducted a study of 
how labels are used to describe images on the world-wide-web using the photo-sharing 
website flickr.com (see Figure 3). On flickr.com, people upload their pictures and give 
them titles and descriptions.  Any user then can “tag” any of the uploaded photos with a 
label.  For example, there is a photo of a dragonfly on a flower titled “My beautiful guest” 
that has been tagged with dragonfly, nature, and flower among other things.  Essentially, 
flickr.com can be seen as a corpus of natural categorization free of artificial laboratory 
conditions.  People tag photos because they feel like it, not because they need to fulfill a 
course requirement.  Tagging is relevant, because tagging is hypothesized to be based more 
on (representations that elicit) intrinsic properties than titling and describing a photo.  
The person who titles the photo took the picture, experienced the moment it captured, 
and has a representation of the situation of which the picture is depicting an aspect.  
However, the taggers just come along see a picture and name it, without all the relational 
situation knowledge. They probably just name what they see, i.e. the intrinsic properties 
of the objects pictured.   
 “My beautiful guest” exemplifies this proposal. The photographer experienced this 
dragonfly as her guest, i.e. the dragonfly was seen as visiting her.  Looking at the picture, 







 Flickr.com provides the user with an easy way to verify this proposal.  There are 
two ways to search for photos on flickr.com.  One type of search uses all the text 
associated with the photo, which includes the titles, descriptions and the tags, and the 
other just uses the tags. Definitionally, the first type of search will get more hits because 
it is a superset of the second. Categories that primarily elicit extrinsic properties should 
have a smaller proportion of the superset “all text” search hit by the “tag only” search 
(the “flickr tagged proportion”). Goldwater et al. searched for all the categories used in the 
property-listing experiment with both search commands. They found that the  
flickr tagged proportion was significantly lower for role-governed category labels (M =  
.2) than it is for the feature based category labels (M =.34). This is important real world 
support for the role-governed category proposal.  
 In a second analysis, Goldwater et al. ignored the distinction between role-governed 
and feature-based categories and created a continuum based on the proportion of extrinsic 
properties listed for every category used in the previous experiment. The proportion of 
extrinsic properties was then regressed against the flickr tagged proportion. Increases in 
extrinsic properties had corresponding decreases in flickr tagged proportion. This effect 
was quite large. The extrinsic proportion accounted for approximately one third of the 
variance in the flickr tagged proportion. That results taken from a laboratory investigation 
with 30 subjects could be such a powerful predictor of millions of real-world behaviors is 







 Goldwater et al.’s third study distinguished role-governed from feature-based 
categories. It was inspired by a common finding in the categorization literature that 
category members differ in their goodness of membership to the category, e.g. a Toyota  
Camry is a better example of a car than a Ferrari (even if a Ferrari is a better car).  Often, 
the average member of a category is judged to be the most typical or “best” exemplar of a 
category.  Indeed, important data produced to evaluate early prototype and exemplar 
models was the finding that central category members are deemed more typical than 
peripheral category members (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986; Posner & 
Keele, 1968).    
 Central tendencies are clearly important for determining the typicality of exemplars 
of feature-based categories.  However, research on ad hoc, and goal-derived categories 
(Barsalou 1983, 1985) and studies of categorization by experts (Lynch, Coley  
& Medin, 2000) demonstrate that ideal category members can influence people’s beliefs 
about goodness of membership as well.  Ideal members have extreme values on the 
relevant dimensions.  For example, the goal-derived category “diet food” has an ideal value 
of 0 along the calorie dimension.  If one were to average all the foods classified as diet 
foods, not only would the average be much larger than 0, there may not be a single 
exemplar that has that value, and yet the goodness of membership to the category is based 






ideal category members also influenced judgments of tree experts who have goals related 
to their interactions with trees (e.g., arborists).    
 Goldwater et al. suggested that role-governed categories are like goal-derived 
categories because they have prominent ideals in their representations.    Like all 
categories, exemplars vary in their goodness of membership.  In role-governed categories, 
category members differ in the degree to which they fulfill the role in the relational 
structure.  Because the ability to serve the relational role is crucial, goodness of category 
membership should be related to this ideal rather than to the average values of the 
particular items that happen to be part of that category.    
 This study assessed the role of typical and ideal category properties as predictors 
of category goodness.  The measure used for category goodness was the utility of 
category properties for explaining the category to someone else.  Explanatory theories are 
crucial parts of the information people use to classify items (Ahn, Kim, Lassaline, & 
Dennis, 2000; Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rehder, 2003).  If ideals are more 
important for role-governed categories than for feature-based categories, then properties 
that pick out ideal category values should have a more prominent role for people trying to 
explain the category to someone else than should properties that pick out typical 
category values.  
 To test this hypothesis, some participants were asked to list properties of ideal 






participants had listed typical properties. Goldwater et al. constructed lists of the five 
most frequently listed ideal properties and the five most frequently listed typical 
properties.  Properties that were listed frequently for both ideal and typical examples 
were not included.  A new group of participants was shown the ideal and typical 
property lists and were asked which list they would use to explain the category to 
someone with no knowledge of it.  Confirming their predictions, subjects chose ideal 
property lists more frequently for role-governed categories than for feature-based. This 
demonstrates another dimension upon which role-governed and feature-based categories 
differ, the prominence of ideals.  
2.2 Inducing role-governed categories from relational categories  
 Goldwater et al.’s first three studies empirically distinguished role-governed from 
feature-based categories, their fourth investigated the hypothesis that role-governed 
categories emerge from relational categories. This view proposes that instantiating novel 
relational categories licenses novel role-governed categories. A side benefit of this study is 
that it suggests role-governed categories are straight-forward to acquire.  Goldwater et 
al.’s fourth study investigated these two hypotheses by examining how role-governed 
categories might be learned in the context of learning new verbs.  
 Their participants instantiated relational structures by interpreting novel denominal 
verbs (i.e. novel verbs derived from nouns).  Many familiar verbs are denominal, e.g. dust, 






Interpreting a novel denominal verb creates a relational representation from a feature-
based category.  While this is certainly a complex process, novel denominal verbs are 
readily understood in their first encounter in on-line sentence comprehension (Goldwater 
& Markman 2009, see Kaschak & Glenberg, 2000 for an off-line comprehension task) 
suggesting they are a reasonable object of study for the instantiation of novel semantic 
representations.  
 The use of novel denominal verbs also allows the instantiation of relational 
representations that are rooted in pre-existing knowledge, allowing concept learning to be 
rapid and to be embedded in the simple reading of short passages. For example, consider 
the sentence: “On the first night of Mardi Gras, Paul whiskied himself stupid.” We can 
test whether this instantiation licenses a novel role-governed category by using the –er 
morpheme in English to create a novel agent term.  So, later in a passage containing the 
sentence about Paul, we could refer to him as the whiskier.  If people are able to form 
novel role-governed concepts when they instantiate a relational structure, then being 
exposed to a novel denominal verb should immediately allow them to understand the role-
governed category.     
 The control passages were identical except for the sentence introducing the novel 
verb. The first control uses a paraphrase of the sentence with the novel denominal verb, 
but without the lexical innovation, e.g.  “On the first night of Mardi Gras, Paul used 






derived from the same root noun, e.g. “On the first night of Mardi Gras, Paul had a 
whiskeylicious time.”  This second control condition was included to rule out a “general 
novelty effect.”  One could argue that the novel agent term is read faster after the novel 
verb just because once one has read a novel word derived from a root word, it is then 
easier to understand any other novel word derived from that same root word.  If the novel 
denominal verb condition has an advantage over the novel adjective condition, then this 
general novelty effect cannot explain the results in entirety, and instead there is support 
for the special link between verbs and agents.   
 In all conditions, because the event of Paul drinking a lot of whiskey is understood, 
the term whiskier is understandable, but because of the special link between verbs and 
agents, between relational and role-governed categories, understanding the same novel 
agent term after the novel denominal verb should be easiest.  The final sentence of the 
passages for each condition were identical “The next day, the whiskier slept in until 
2:00.” Goldwater et al. found that processing time for the novel agent term was faster 
when it was preceded by the novel verb than by either control, confirming the 
hypothesized relation between relational and role-governed categories.   
 Goldwater et al.’s reading time effect is strong evidence for the connection between 
relational and role-governed categories, but it does not shed much light on the nature of 
the novel agent licensing process. Goldwater et al. (2009) hypothesized that the licensing 






context can seem so effortless. However, it is possible that more explicit reasoning 
processes are involved.  A third possibility is that the effect is simply one of morpho-
syntax because agent terms marked by “-er” are derived from verbs.  To extend the 
reading time study, Goldwater et al. replicated it (without the adjective condition, as the 
general novelty effect was already ruled out) using an Event-Related Potential paradigm 
because different ERP components are markers of these different processing systems. A 
relative difference in the N400 component is a sign of implicit semantic memory 
processes, while a difference in the Late Positive Component (LPC), aka the P600, is a 
marker of explicit decision processes and morphosyntactic processing (Heinze, Muente, 
& Kutas, 1998; Kim & Osterhout, 2005; Voss & Paller, 2005).   The novel agent term 
showed a reduced N400 when preceded by the novel verb than when preceded by the 
paraphrase, and there were no reliable differences in the LPC. Thus, Goldwater et al. 
concluded that licensing novel role-governed category terms from interpreting novel 
relational terms is an implicit semantic process.   
2.3 Conclusion  
  There were two primary goals of this reviewed work. One was to develop  
empirical markers distinguishing role-governed categories from feature-based categories.  
The two categories were distinguished by: 1) The larger proportion of extrinsic properties 
2) Smaller flickr tagged proportion 3) Greater explanatory value of ideals for role-






novel relational structures license novel role-governed categories. These studies confirmed 
this hypothesis and demonstrated that the licensing process is run by the implicit 
semantic system.   I now discuss the next set of questions and present the principal 






3. Dissertation Experiments  
 My framework claims that role-governed categories are formed by categorizing 
entities together by their common relational role. Much of my previous work examined 
familiar role-governed categories, and so did not reveal how these categories were initially 
formed. The goal of my dissertation experiments is to test this claim that entities are 
categorized by common role directly, i.e., by presenting participants with entities that 
share a relational role, and eliciting judgments of categorization.  
 Having participants make explicit categorization judgments allows for a number of 
research goals to be achieved. First, these experiments provide critical evidence for the 
framework laid out in this dissertation. Other models of categorization do not make 
predictions about whether entities will be categorized by common roles, whereas it may 
be my model’s most straightforward prediction. Second, the experiments help to further 
specify the presented framework by revealing the processes involved in making such 
categorization judgments.   
 Categorizing two entities by common relational role requires first representing each 
entity by its relational role in its domains, and then representing the relational 
commonality across domains.  Retrieving relational connections across domains is far 
from trivial (Gick & Holyoak, 1981), yet it is a prerequisite for role-governed 
categorization. Thus, it is quite possible that without something to make participants 






represent within-domain connections. The proposed experiments examine ways to induce 
such shifts in attention.   
 The experiments examine two processes that may lead to increased across- domain 
connections, and hence more role-governed categorization judgments.  Experiment 1 
investigates the extension of category labels. Experiments 2 -4 examines the structural 
alignment of relational representations (Gentner & Markman, 1997). I now discuss each 
in turn.  
 The first process I examine is the how category labels affect role-governed 
categorization. Labels have a very important role in category representation, as they have 
been shown to attribute essences (Gelman & Heyman, 1999) and generate category 
coherence (Yamauchi, 2005). Evaluating how labels direct attention towards common 
roles will connect role-governed categorization research with the field of categorization 
more broadly. In addition, it may potentially alter how the field views the role of labels in 
categorization because the effects of labels are thought to be privileged for feature-based 
categories (e.g., E. Markman, 1989. Role-governed categories were not considered, as the 
idea was yet to be conceived).   
 Labels have been shown to focus children on feature-based categories, and divert 
their attention from thematic relations. Markman (1989) showed that young children will 
show a preference for thematic relation categories when they are asked to make 






in the form of “what goes best with this picture?” and they are shown a picture of a 
robin, they will choose a picture that forms a thematic relation, e.g. a picture of a nest, 
over a picture of another bird.  However, if the robin is given a novel label e.g., a goppin, 
and then children are asked which other object is also a goppin, they will choose the 
object with greater feature-based similarity instead of the thematic relation match.   
Natural thematic-relation categories do not have labels, whereas natural feature-based 
categories do. This label advantage for feature-based categories is interpreted to show the 
importance of feature-based categories in mature conceptual systems.  
 Natural role-governed categories also have labels. If labels promote role-governed 
categorization over thematic relation-based, then at least for adults, role-governed 
categories should be seen to share this importance in the conceptual system.  
 However, the extension of novel labels across domains does not necessarily shed 
light on the mechanism behind finding the across domain relational correspondences. One 
potential mechanism is structural alignment, the mechanism underlying analogical 
comparison. When forming an analogy, people seek similarities in the relations that 
describe a pair of domains, even if the objects that take part in those relations are not 
identical.  Thus, the atom was once seen to be similar to the solar system, because it was 
hypothesized that there is one element that revolves around another in each, even though 
electrons do not look like planets, and nuclei do not look like the sun.  Structural 






representations by putting entities into correspondence by role, ignoring featural 
dissimilarities.   
 Markman and Gentner (1993) showed that comparison induces structural 
alignment.   The task was to indicate which character in one scene corresponded to a 
character in a second scene.  For example, one scene would depict a woman giving food to 
a squirrel, whereas the second scene would depict a pizza delivery guy giving food to a 
woman.  When prompted to select which character in the second scene corresponded with 
the woman from the first scene, participants would pick the second woman. However, if 
the subjects compared the two scenes (via a similarity rating) before making their 
selection, then they overwhelmingly dismissed the feature-based commonality between 
the two women, and put the first woman in correspondence with the delivery guy, as 
both were playing the food giver role.    
 While putting objects into correspondence seems like a good basis for categorizing 
them together, it may not be enough if people do not think sharing a relational role is a 
good basis for a category. However, if structural alignment is a mechanism of role-
governed categorization, then rating two entities similarity, e.g., bodyguard and forcefield, 
should increase the likelihood they are judged to form a category.  
 Experiments 2 -4 do not just investigate whether similarity ratings increase role-
governed categorization, but how making those comparisons support it. They contrast 






elements in the comparison, affecting the representation of each comparison 
independently. 2. Similarity ratings prime a general mode of role-governed responding, 
such that the effect of making similarity ratings on one set of entities transfer to sets of 
entities that were not directly compared. 
 In sum, the dissertation experiments will primarily examine two potential processes 
of categorizing entities by their common relational role. The use of novel category labels 
will potentially extend the “label privilege” of feature-based categories to role-governed 
categories. Having participants rate entities’ similarity before making category judgments 
will reveal whether structural alignment is a mechanism of role-governed categorization. 
Now, I turn to describing the experimental methods, pilot studies, and stimuli norming.  
3.1 Methods and Pilot Study 1  
  The primary method these studies use to elicit categorization judgments is the 
classic triad categorization task, where there is a target word or picture, and the subject is 
asked which of two alternatives goes better with the target to form a category.  A recent 
relevant example is Lin and Murphy (2001) who used this task to contrast thematic 
relation with feature-based categorization. Participants were presented with a target word, 
e.g., cat, and asked to indicate whether an entity that formed a thematic relation with the 
target, e.g., litter box, or a feature-based match, e.g., lion, better made a category with the 
target.   






categorization. After describing these pilot studies, I describe a series of experiments that 
move the rates of such categorizations above baseline levels, and in doing so reveal 
underlying processes.  
 The first question to ask is: will people choose to categorize objects together based 
on common relational role at all? Thus, in this first pilot study, the two alternates with 
which to form a category with the target was a concept that shared the target’s relational 
role (the role match) and a relatively unrelated term. For example, bodyguard’s role match 
is force-field and its unrelated alternate was scissors (see Table 2 for complete set).   
Methods 
Participants  
 Thirty University of Texas undergrads participated in this experiment for course- 
credit.  
Materials  
 The stimuli are listed in Table 2 (only targets, role-matches, and unrelated alternates 
used for this experiment).  
Procedure  
 Thirty participants were tested individually, at computers using the experimental 
software E-Prime.  The instructions were modified from Lin and Murphy (2001).  
Participants were told:   






Specifically, we are interested in what things you think go together to make categories.   
A category is a set of things or people that share some commonalities—be it genetic 
makeup, functions, physical or perceptual characteristics, purposes, or behavioral 
predispositions.   
Every trial in this study will present 3 words.  One will be at the top of the screen.  The 
other two will be below, and marked by an “A or B”.  Your job is to choose which one of 
the two lower words goes best with the higher word to form a category by pressing A or 
B.  
  
 Every trial presented the three words as described, with the target word put in the 
sentence “Which better goes with X to form a category?” On every trial participants 
selected A or B. On half of the trials the role match was choice A, and half choice B. Their 
selections and response times were recorded. There were 20 trials.  This took 
approximately 5 minutes.  
Results and Discussion 
 There was a strong preference for the role matches, as they were chosen at an 
average proportion of .91, while the unrelated alternate was chosen at a rate of .09.  
 Participants were clearly able to make affirmative categorization judgments based on 
common relational role. This was crucial to establish. However, the unrelated alternates 






not provide a window into the mechanism underlying such judgments. To reveal such a 
mechanism, one would need to perform a manipulation that changes the rate of role 
selections. Thus, the goal of this second study is to demonstrate a scenario where role 
selections are much lower, so they will then have room to be increased by further 
experimental manipulations.  
3.2 Pilot Study 2  
 The second pilot study uses the same methods to contrast role-governed 
categorization with thematic relation categorization. The former entails categorizing 
objects by their common role across situations, while the latter entails categorizing objects 
together that play corresponding roles in the same situation. For example, bodyguard’s 
thematic match is celebrity. Thematic relation categorization should be preferred because 
the connection is more salient; it entails activating one situation schema where all the 
elements are directly bound to each other, while role-governed categorization entails 
activating two relational representations and finding connections across them. Indeed, 
thematic relation categories were shown to even be preferable to feature-based matches in 
many contexts (Lin & Murphy, 2001).  
Methods 
Participants  








 The stimuli are listed in Table 2. Here, thematic matches are used in place of the 
unrelated alternate.  
Procedure  
 This procedure is identical to that from the first study.  
Results and Discussion 
 In contrast to the 1st study, participants showed a strong bias away from the role 
matches. They selected the role matches, at an average rate of  .2, while selecting the 
thematic match at a rate of .8.  
 In addition, response time patterns were suggestive.  I claimed that thematic relation 
connections are more easily accessed as only a single situation schema needs to be 
activated, while multiple relational representations needs to be activated and compared in 
role-governed categorization. While these response times need to be interpreted with 
caution, they are consistent with that claim. Role selections (M = 5.163 sec) were reliably 
slower than thematic relation selections (M = 3.335 sec), t (24) = 3.55, p < .01 by subjects  
(not including subjects who did not select a single role match), and by items, t (19) =  
2.69, p < .05. In addition, the number of role selections made was predictive of an increase 
in average response time for all selections, showing a trend by subjects, r (29) =  
.31, p < .1 and r (19) = .47, p < .05 by items.    






categories in this second study.  This was the goal.  Now, a baseline is established.  
From here we can examine what will focus subjects on across situation connections, and 
de-emphasize thematic dyads.  
3.3 Stimulus Norming  
 In addition to the pilot studies, these stimuli were normed, ensuring empirically that 
the stimuli are implementing what I am claiming, that is, that the role matches are really 
role matches.  Some of the role matches could also be cross-classified as members of a 
common feature-based category e.g., patients and customers are both people. In these 
cases, I chose an unrelated alternate also cross-classifiable in this same category, e.g., 
blacksmith.  However, these intuitions need to be confirmed with data. Subjects listed 
things that the target words have in common with all three kinds of alternative choices 
from the pilot studies.  These were coded as intrinsic or extrinsic. Two findings are 
critical. 1. Role and thematic matches elicit primarily extrinsic commonalities, confirming 
that judgments about shared category membership with the target is not rooted in 
common intrinsic features. 2. Role matches must not have more intrinsic commonalities 
with the targets than either of the other two. The results are shown in Table 3.  
 For all three kinds of matches, extrinsic commonalities were listed more frequently 
than intrinsic commonalities.  In addition, all three alternate types had virtually identical 
rates of listing intrinsic properties. However, they differed in the number of extrinsic 






by items. The Tukey HSD test showed that the role matches elicited more extrinsic 
commonalties than the unrelated matches, but no other comparison was significant.  
Importantly, these results confirm the suitability of these materials. The role match has 
no reliable advantage in terms of number of properties in common with the thematic 
match, and no advantage in number of intrinsic properties over the other alternates. 
Finally, in a qualitative analysis, suggesting our intuitions were correct about role matches 
being role matches, many of subjects explicitly listed their relational commonality. For 
example, for coffee and Red Bull, one subject reported “they both give you energy.”   
3.4 Experiment 1  
 Category labels are more than just another property of the category: category labels 
are thought to attribute essences (Gelman & Heyman, 1999), and generate coherence 
(Yamauchi, 2005). Proposed experiment 2 examines whether novel category labels focus 
subjects on role-governed categorization.   
 Labels have been shown to focus children on feature-based categories, and divert 
their attention for thematic relations in the triad categorization task (E. Markman, 1989, 
and see above). Natural thematic-relation categories do not have labels, whereas natural 
feature-based categories do. This label advantage for feature-based categories is 
interpreted to show the importance of feature-based categories in mature conceptual 
systems. Natural role-governed categories also have labels. If labels promote role- 






governed categories should be seen to share this importance in the conceptual system. 
Experiment 1 examines whether presenting the categorization judgment in the form of a 
novel word extension task will promote role choices.   
 This experiment has two conditions using the materials from pilot study 2.  
The first condition examines the extension of category labels. The target is labeled a 
goppin and then the question is asked which alternate is better also called goppin. The 
second condition examines the extension of properties across items, in the form of a novel 
adjective. This will function as a control, ensuring that any advantage for role choices is 
not just about novel word extension, but particularly about category labels. For example, 
in the category label condition, the query reads: “That bodyguard is a goppin. Which of 
these other two is better called goppin.”  In the novel property condition: “That’s a 
goppin bodyguard. Which of these other two is better called goppin.” The first condition 
should boost role choices, as role-governed categories, and not thematic relation categories 
have labels.  In contrast, the same advantage may not be present in the property condition 
because people often extend properties across members of thematic relation categories 
(Lin & Murphy, 2001). 
Methods 
Participants 







 The materials are those presented in Table 2, using the role and thematic matches.  
Instead of the question asked being about category membership as in the pilot study, the 
query concerned novel word extension. There were two novel words used, goppin and 
blicket. One condition used one nonce word, and the other condition used the other nonce 
word (counterbalanced across subjects which word went with which condition). For 
example, in the category label condition, the query reads: “That bodyguard is a goppin. 
Which of these other two is better called goppin.”  In the novel property condition: 
“That’s a blicket bodyguard. Which of these other two is better called blicket.” 
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as from the pilot studies, except the instructions were 
altered to explain about the use of the nonce words. They read: 
In this experiment we are interested in how you think about everyday things in the world. 
Specifically, we are interested in what things should be described or named with the same 
words. In this experiment, you will read statements about everyday things that are 
described or named with a new word. Your job is to indicate what else should be named or 
described with this same new word. 
  
There is one new word used for all the new names, as well as a single new word for the 
descriptions. But treat each presentation of the new word separately. Meaning, when 
thinking about the new word, and what else should be named or described with it, do not 
consider what this new word has already been used to name or describe for your previous 
choice. 
 
 Every trial presented the three critical words, the target, and the role and thematic 
matches, with the target word put in the sentence “That X is a goppin?” or “That X is a 






the novel adjective condition. Below the target sentence, a sentence reads “Which of these 
other two is better called goppin (or blicket)?”  Then, below are the two alternates, 
marked by an A or B. On half of the trials the role match was choice A, and half choice B. 
Their selections and response times were recorded. There were 20 trials.  This took 
approximately 5 minutes. 
Results and Discussion 
 If people think role-governed categories are more worthy of labels than thematic 
relation categories, then the label condition should produce more role-choices than the 
property condition. This prediction was confirmed, with the label condition eliciting a 
rate of role choices of .66, while the property condition elicited a .38 proportion, t (26) = 
4.46, p < .001 by subjects, t (19) = 9.53, p < .00001, by items.  For clarification, unlike 
the pilot studies where the statistical tests compare thematic to role choices without a 
separate experimental manipulation, these statistical tests are comparing the proportion 
of role choices across two conditions.  
 These results suggest that the category label privilege first conceived in regards to 
feature-based categories should be extended to role-governed categories. Also suggestive is 
the proportion of role choices in the property condition. The baseline established from 
Pilot study 2 was 20% role choices. It was almost twice this in the property condition. 
This suggests that people make property inductions across members of role-governed 






an important topic of future research (see below). 
3.5 Experiment 2  
 The second experiment examines a potential mechanism for role-governed 
categorization. The candidate mechanism is “structural alignment,” the mechanism 
underlying analogical comparison (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Markman,  
1997). As explained above, when forming an analogy, people seek similarities in the 
relations that describe a pair of domains, even if the objects that take part in those 
relations are not identical. Structural alignment explains this perceived similarity through a 
process that aligns relational representations by putting entities into correspondence by 
role, ignoring featural dissimilarities.   
 Intuitively, placing entities into correspondence, and increasing their perceived 
similarity seems like a good basis for categorization. However, this hypothesis has not 
been directly tested, because research on analogy and categorization has been somewhat 
disconnected. This experiment promotes structural alignment in subjects by having them 
rate the alternative choices’ similarity with the target. Similarity ratings have been shown 
to promote role-based correspondences over feature-based (Markman & Gentner, 1993).  
This experiment tests whether similarity ratings promotes role-governed categorization.  
  Experiment 2 has two conditions. In the first, subjects rate the similarity of the 
target with both the role and thematic relation match. Then the triad categorization 






imageability of the pairs of words. This will ensure that any advantage for role-matches in 
the first condition is not simply due to making any comparative rating. If structural 
alignment is a mechanism of role-governed categorization, then there should be more role-
choices in the similarity condition. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Thirty-nine University of Texas undergrads participated for course credit. 
Materials 
 The materials used are identical to those from Pilot Study 2, with additional 
judgments made on the sets of words. For similarity ratings, two words were presented, 
the target and one of the alternates. The query read: how similar are [Target] and 
[Alternate]? The target and alternate were presented in large font on their own line. There 
was a 7 point Likert scale, that ranged from Not Similar to Very Similar. For relative 
imageability ratings, two words were presented, the target and one of the alternates. The 
query read: Which is easier to picture in your head: A [Target] or B [Alternate]? There 
was a 7 point Likert scale, that ranged from A is easier at 1 to Both are equal at 3 and B is 
easier at 7.  
 Half of the trials had similarity ratings, and half had imageability ratings. The order 
was randomized. Which items were rated for similarity and which for imageability was 







  The procedure was identical to Pilot study 2, with the addition of the other 
judgments and modified instructions, which read (the description for the category 
judgment trial was identical to the description from the pilot studies, so is not included): 
In this experiment we are interested in how you think about everyday things in the 
world.   Specifically, we are interested in:  
 1. What things you find similar.  
 2. What things are easy to picture in your head. 
 3. What things you think go together to make categories. 
 
There are three kinds of trials. One kind for each of the three questions we are interested 
in. 
 
In the first kind of trial, you will judge how similar you find two words to be. They will 
be presented in the middle of the screen. Below, there will be a scale from 1 - 7. 1 means 
that you see no similarity between the two words. 7 means that you see very high 
similarity between the two words. Please press the number that best matches how similar 
you find the two words, from 1-7. 
  
In the second kind of trial, you will judge how easy it is to picture one word in your head 
relative to another. Each word will be presented in the middle of the screen, and will 
be marked by an 'A' or a 'B.' Below, there will be a scale from 1 - 7. 1 means that you 
find word A much easier to picture.7 means that you find word B much easier to picture. 
4 means that you find them both equal. Please indicate which one you find easier to 
picture by pressing a number, 1 - 7.  
 
 Each trial consisted of three judgments. The first two judgments were of the same 
type. Both of the two judgments were either similarity ratings comparing the target with 
each of the two alternates or both were relative imageability ratings, also comparing the 
target with each of the two alternates. Half of the trials presented the judgment comparing 
the target to the role match first, and half the thematic match first. The third judgment 
was the triad categorization judgment identical to the pilot studies.  






 If structural alignment is a mechanism of role-governed categorization, then the 
category judgments preceded by the similarity comparisons should elicit a higher rate of 
role choices than when preceded by the imageability ratings.  The predicted pattern was 
found, with the similarity condition eliciting a .3 proportion of role choices, as compared 
with a .24 proportion elicited by the imageability rating. However, this was merely a 
trend by subjects, t (38) = 1.73, p < .1, and reliable by items, t (19) = 2.18, p < .05. 
 While the results went in the predicted direction, the effect, in terms of raw 
scores, was not very large. The similarity condition only elicited 6% more role choices 
than the imageability condition (compare that with Experiment 1, where the category 
condition elicited an increase of 28% compared to the property condition). There are a 
few possibilities to explain the small effect. 1. Structural alignment is not a large part of 
role-governed categorization. 2. Structural alignment is an important process of role-
governed categorization, but there was some influence of switching between judgment 
types on successive trials. Experiment 3 attempts to tease these two explanations apart. 
3.6. Experiment 3 
 The goal of Experiment 3 is to demonstrate that structural alignment is a 
mechanism of role-governed categorization. Structural alignment is induced through 
similarity ratings, and to reduce the potential influence of making other kinds of 
comparison in Experiment 3, the two kinds of judgments, similarity and imageability, 








 Thirty University of Texas undergrads participated for course credit. 
Materials 
 The stimuli were identical to those from Experiment 2. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to that from Experiment 2, except the comparison 
manipulation was between subjects. The instructions were modified accordingly. 
Results and Discussion 
If structural alignment is a mechanism of role-governed categorization, then the 
category judgments preceded by the similarity comparisons should elicit a higher rate of 
role choices than when preceded by the imageability ratings.  The predicted pattern was 
found, with the similarity condition eliciting a .41 proportion of role choices, as 
compared with a .21 proportion elicited by the imageability rating. This was reliable both 
by subjects, t (29) = 2.24, p < .05, and by items, t (19) = 4.18, p < .001. 
 Experiment 2 showed that rating two items’ similarity increased their likelihood 
of being categorized together when the two items play a common role across domains, 
but the effect was relatively small when similarity judgments were intermixed with 
relative imageability ratings.  Experiment 3, with half of the subjects making similarity 
ratings on all trials and half making relative imageability ratings, the power of the 
manipulation increased. Here, the similarity condition elicited nearly twice as many role 
choices as the imageability condition.  This suggests that the small effect seen in 
experiment 2 was due to the influence of switching judgment type from trial to trial. 






governed categorization consistent with the pattern across these two experiments. 1. The 
similarity rating induces structural alignment of the particular elements in the comparison, 
affecting the representation of each comparison independently. 2. Similarity ratings prime 
a general mode of role-governed responding. Because these two accounts cannot be 
distinguished on the basis of the current pattern, Experiment 4 attempts to tease the two 
apart. 
3.7 Experiment 4 
 Similarity ratings may be inducing structural alignment on a per-trial basis, or it 
might be putting subjects into a general mode of role-governed responding. These 
explanations differ because the latter predicts that this general mode, once induced should 
be transferable to trials that do not directly induce structural alignment via a similarity 
rating. While it is clear from Experiment 2 that the role-governed mode of responding 
does not transfer from trial to trial when similarity ratings and imageability ratings are 
intermixed, this does not rule out the possibility that if subjects made an entire block of 
only similarity ratings, whether this would solidify the role-governed mode of responding 
enough to then allow transfer to a block of trials where imageability ratings were being 
given. Experiment 4 tests this hypothesis by having two blocks of trials each entirely 
composed of trials of one judgment type and manipulates their order. 
Methods 
Participants 







 The materials were identical to that from Experiment 2, except there were 4 
experimental scripts to counterbalance which items were rated for similarity or 
imageability, and whether similarity or imageability ratings were given first. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to that from Experiment 2, except the similarity and 
imageability trials were blocked, instead of intermixed. Order within-block was 
randomized. 
Results and Discussion 
 If similarity ratings induce a general role-governed responding mode, then the 
imageability trials should elicit a higher rate of role-governed responding when following 
the block of similarity trials than when preceding it. However, this order effect must be 
greater for the imageability condition than the similarity condition to claim the effect is 
about a transfer of role-governed responding, and not just a more general order effect. 
That is, block order and judgment type must interact.   
 2 (judgment type: similarity, imageability) X 2 (order: similarity 1st, imageability 
1st) mixed-measures ANOVA (by subjects) and repeated-measures ANOVA (by items) 
revealed main effects of judgment type, f (1,35) = 22.4, p < .001, by subjects, and f (1, 
19) = 23.7, p < .001, by items, as the similarity condition (M = .30) elicited a higher 
proportion of role-governed responses than the imageability rating (M = .12). There was 
no main of effect of block order, f (1, 35) = .145, by subjects, and f (1, 19) = 2.12, by 
items p’s > .15.  Importantly, there was no interaction between block order and judgment 






Thus, there is only evidence that similarity ratings induced structural alignment on a per-
comparison basis, and not for a general role-governed responding mode. 
The large main effect of judgment type replicates Experiment 3. However, here, it 
is a within subjects manipulation as in Experiment 2. This suggests that the original 
interpretation that the small effect found in Experiment 2 was due to the costs of 
switching between judgments types throughout the experiment was correct, as the current 
experiment only has a single judgment-type switch halfway through the trials. 
3.8 Summary of Results 
 These four experiments advance our understanding of role-governed categorization, 
and make crucial evaluations of the model of conceptual representation described 
throughout the dissertation. Traditionally, feature-based categories are seen as privileged 
in mature conceptual systems. One sign of this advantage is that they have category 
labels, and even very young children take advantage of this to guide their word learning (E. 
Markman, 1989).  Experiment 1 argues that role-governed categories should be seen as 
equally prominent, as role-governed categories have labels, and novel label use can direct 
one’s attention to role based commonalities across entities, just as they do for featural.  
 Experiments 2 – 4 examine an underlying mechanism of role-governed categorization 
by connecting it with analogical reasoning through the shared process of structural 
alignment. The pattern across three experiments shows that aligning relational 
representations, that is, putting entities into correspondence by role, leads to increased 






works on a per-comparison basis, and does not induce a general role-governed response 






4. General Discussion, Implications and Future Directions 
 Traditionally in Cognitive Psychology (and Western Philosophy more broadly), 
categories are thought to be represented as sets of features. This dissertation, following 
Markman & Stilwell (2001), looks to establish a new way to think about category 
representation that seeks to unify work on categorization and concept learning with other 
areas in higher-level cognition such as analogical reasoning. The framework emphasizes 
structured relational knowledge representations, and creates a taxonomy of categories 
based on different components of relational structures. Relational categories are categories 
of entire relational systems while, role-governed categories, the focus of this dissertation, 
are represented as the roles in the relational systems.  Lastly, thematic relation categories 
group entities together that play complementary roles within these systems.   
 Four experiments were presented that support this framework and further specifies 
it. They contrasted thematic relation categorization with role-governed categorization. 
When the two are put in direct conflict, that is, when one has to choose which two items 
go better together to make a category, people prefer two that form a thematic relation 
category over two that form a role category. This is predicted because within-domain 
connections are easier to find than across-domain connections. However, when one is to 
extend a label across a pair of items, then role-based commonalities are preferred. This is 
predicted as natural role-governed categories have labels while thematic relation categories 






likelihood of preferring the role-based pair. 
 The first finding demonstrates the prominence of role-governed categories in our 
conceptual system and lexicon, and the second specifies an underlying mechanism that is 
shared with analogical reasoning. However, there are many open questions, and many 
more predictions this framework generates. Here, I relate the current findings to a few 
avenues of future research.   
4.1 Learning Role-Governed Categories from Events 
 The current experiments looked at processes of categorizing entities across domain 
by common role. While the connections across domains may have been novel to the 
participants, all the individual entities were familiar, and the relational correspondences 
were found through the subject’s pre-existing knowledge of the world. However, it seems 
very likely that many role-governed categories are first learned from observation of and 
interaction with the world in novel situations. For example, when children first learn 
about guests and hosts, it is probably through witnessing and participating in novel 
visiting events. That said, the current findings are relevant in that the framework predicts 
that the use of labels and structural alignment will be critical in forming such concepts 
from direct observation (see Gentner & Loewenstein, 2002). 
 Thus, one important line of research would be to examine how people learn event 
role categories from observing events.  Participants will view a series of events, able to be 






subjects would then be queried into what categories were formed.  What would cause 
people to form categories of participants across the events based on common role? Similar 
manipulations to the current studies will be done to test their generality, e.g., inducing the 
structural alignment of the event exemplars. Also, completely novel questions would be 
asked in such a paradigm. One interesting question is to what degree roles are learned as 
systems or as independent. For example, can one learn about guests without also learning 
about hosts? Goldwater et al. (2009) show that instantiating relations licenses role-
governed categories. Would learning event role categories be dependent on first learning 
the event categories? Once the event categories are learned, are all event roles licensed as a 
system? 
 Research investigating how role-governed categories are learned from viewing events 
is already underway (in collaboration with Cathy Echols). This project is examining how 
children learn that a noun refers to an event role and not a feature-based category. One 
process that may be of critical importance to children in learning about roles is turn-taking 
(Tomasello, personal communication). That is, seeing the same entities taking turns 
playing different event roles may be critical to abstracting the role away from the features 
of the particular participants who are playing it. 
4.2 Labels, Induction and Category Coherence 
 An important function of categories is supporting induction about objects and 
events. Labels increase inductive strength.  Category labels are thought to assign category 






category essential properties to individuals, e.g., labeling someone a “feminist” increases 
the likelihood that that person believes in equal rights for women  (Gelman & Heyman, 
1999; Yamauchi & Markman, 1998, 2000). Yamauchi (2005) extended these findings by 
showing labels increase inductive strength for even unlikely characteristics of a person, 
e.g., labeling someone a “feminist” increases the inductive strength that she is a bank 
teller.  Yamauchi hypothesizes that category labels generate coherence for categories by 
connecting disparate pieces of information together.    
Experiment 1 showed that people think role-governed categories should have labels, 
as they do for feature-based categories. However, many role-governed categories are 
defined by a situation, that is, they are contextually bound. People are guests, hosts, and 
passengers for limited amounts of time. A fundamental question about situational role-
governed categories is the degree to which their labels generate coherence as other types 
of “context-free” categories do. It would seem somewhat strange if labeling someone a 
passenger leads to any inductions about permanent properties about that person. Yet, we 
have rich knowledge about such categories that seems to cohere. 
 Alternatively, they may generate coherence not by tying together disparate pieces 
of information concerning permanent properties of category members, but through 
properties of the situation in which the category members are playing a role. For 
example, the role category of car passenger may only increase attribution for behaviors or 
properties that exist for the duration of the event, e.g., listening to the radio. I am 
currently testing this hypothesis. 






 Experiments 2-4 demonstrate that role-governed categorization and analogy share an 
underlying mechanism.  What is unclear is how coupled the two processes are. In the 
most extreme case, every analogy results in new role concepts. Perhaps, all one needs to 
do after learning about the Rutherford model of the atom to have a role concept that 
includes atomic nuclei, the sun, and any other object in the center of an orbiting system, is 
just to attach a label to it. This perspective that analogy and role concept learning are 
tightly coupled will generate many new research ideas. 
 Analogies are central to conceptual change, both throughout history (Arabatziz, 
2009) and in individuals (Vosniadou, 2009). Arabatziz (2009) examined the use of 
analogies in early 20th century physics to move away from the Rutherford model to the 
Bohr model. Vosniadou (2009) showed the importance of analogy in teaching young 
children the proper mental model of the day/night cycle.  Many young children have a 
mental model of day and night that represents a motionless Earth, and a sun and moon 
that alternate between rising into the sky and hiding behind mountains. Explicitly stating 
to a group of Greek elementary school children that the Earth’s rotation was a critical 
piece of the day/night cycle had no effect on their model. However, making an analogy to 
the rotating obelisk of gyro meat, a rich base domain for Greek children, dramatically 
changed their understanding of the domain.  
 Studies such as Vosniadou (2009) tend to look at understanding domains as wholes, 






such work is the suggestion to examine elements of these relational systems as concepts 
in their own right.  That is, perhaps what it means to have a new mental model of a 
domain is to have a new system of role concepts. A main function of analogies is to 
generate inferences. In many cases, analogical inference may be akin to role-governed 
category based induction.  Of course, this is rather speculative at this point, however, 
making further connections between analogy and concept learning should be a fruitful line 
of research. Establishing their connection in these simple experiments presented here is 
just a first step. 
4.4 Expertise and Learning Relational and Role-Governed Categories  
 While all people have relational and role-governed categories, as evidence by our 
lexicon, expertise is often defined as a shift away from feature-based categorization 
towards relational categorization. Chi, Feltovitch & Glaser (1981) showed that physics 
novices categorized problems based on their literal features, while experts used the 
physical relations that define the structure of the problems.  This kind of expertise is 
presumably not learned through observation alone, as perhaps learning simpler relational 
categories may be.  
 While gaining expertise in physical-relational systems is the topic of much science 
education research, using the current framework leads to interesting new questions. For 
example, after physics experts learn to categorize problems by their abstract relational 






what function do these role concepts serve? What inferences do they help generate? 
Because role-governed categories are pieces of larger relational structures, perhaps role 
concepts are used as cues to the larger structures. Identifying a single role could allow one 
to activate an entire schema to aid in problem solving.  
 During my post-doctoral fellowship with Dedre Gentner, I will investigate 
relational and role-governed category learning in a science education context. Particularly, 
how people learn complex systems principles that explain climate change (in collaboration 
with Duncan Sibley, professor of Geo-Sciences). 
4.5 Conclusion 
 This dissertation laid out a framework for category representation that has a rather 
broad scope.  Category research, on the whole, has had a too narrow a focus for far too 
long (Markman & Ross, 2003).  The work presented here establishes a ground-work, but 
the goal of this final chapter is to give a flavor of the large research program taking this 
view of concepts can generate. Categorization is a central cognitive process, and 







Table 1  
Verbs and corresponding role governed categories  
_______________________________________  
Verbs      Role Governed Categories  
x steals y     x= thief  
x visits y     x = guest, y = host  
x trains/advises y  x = mentor, y = protégé  
x gives birth to y  x = mother, y = son or daughter  
x defeats y    x = victor/winner, y = loser  
x eats y     y = food  
x plays y     y = game  
x writes y     x = author  
x gives y to z    y = gift  
x shops in y    x = customer  








Materials for Pilot Studies 1-2 and Experiments 1 - 4 
Target    Role Match  Thematic Match Unrelated Alternate 
Appetizer  Opening Act  Entrée   Bed 
Bird’s Nest  House   Tree   Court 
Bodyguard  Force-field  Celebrity  Scissors   
Bouncer  Tollbooth  People in line outside a club Remote Control 
Coach   Manager  Athlete  Cop 
Coffee   Red Bull  Cream   Lemonade 
Customer  Patient   Salesman  Blacksmith 
Director  Author   Actor   Crossing Guard 
Drawer  Wallet   Socks   Statue 
General  CEO   Private   Accountant 
Hard Drive  Filing Cabinet  Electronic Files Medicine 
Jar   Closet   Pickles   Pillow 
Lock   Security Guard Key   Doctor 
Paralegal  Nurse   Lawyer  Janitor 
Police Chief  Admiral  Beat Cop  Athlete 
Quilt   Campfire  Bed   Truck 
Real Estate Agent Drug Dealer  House-Buyer  Spy 
Teacher  Camp Counselor Student  Linebacker 












Table 3  
Stimulus Norming Results: Mean and SD of Commonalities listed for Each Target 
   Role Match  Thematic Match  Unrelated Alternate 
Commonality Mean (SD)   Mean (SD)   Mean (SD)  
Extrinsic  2.43 (.51)   2.18  (.40)   1.83  (.56) 
Intrinsic  0.70  (.38)   0.76  (.37)   0.73  (.44) 










Figure 1: A) Schematic of feature-based category representation as subordinate to the 
category label B) Schematic of category structure superordinate to the role governed 







Figure 2:  A relational system and its constituent categories.  A relational category, e.g. 
visit names the system.  Role-governed categories, e.g. guest and host, name individual 
arguments.  Grouping the arguments together, creating a category of entities that includes 
guests and hosts, define a thematic relation category.  In any given relational system, e.g. a 
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